

a market in which a willing buyer and a willing seller could legitimately have operated and, therefore, the Board was obliged to take into account the existence of the order controlling prices at the material date.

Raghubir Saran
v.
The Punjab
State
Kapur, J.

The control on rents which the law in existence imposes has, therefore, to be taken into account and recognised in determining what compensation the appellant would be entitled to, and the submission that because of the provisions of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act which have been made applicable a hypothetical market free from all restrictions imposed by law is intended is in my opinion erroneous and the compensation to which the appellant would be entitled would be that which taking into consideration the restriction on rents will be available to the appellant on giving on rent his premises to a person who is willing to take it. I would, therefore, dismiss this appeal but leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.

LETTERS PATENT SIDE.

Before Bhandari, C. J., and Bishan Narain, J.

THE PUNJAB COMMERCEBANK, LTD.—Plaintiff-
Appellant

versus

Shri BRIJ LAL MAHANDIRATTA,—Defendant-
Respondent

Letters Patent Appeal No. 12 of 1953

*Banking Companies Act (X of 1949) as amended by
Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, LII of 1953—Sec-
tion 45-O—Whether retrospective.*

1954
May, 26th

Interpretation of Statutes—Statute when to be given retrospective effect—Rule stated—Limitation—Suit barred by limitation at the date of institution—Whether can be held to be within time by reason of subsequent change in law.

Held, that section 45-0 of the Banking Companies Act (XX of 1949) as amended by Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, LII of 1953, is not retrospective in effect either expressly or by necessary implication so as to revive a claim which before its coming into force had become unenforceable by lapse of time.

Held further, that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right unless the effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language which is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.

Held also, that once a right to sue has become barred under any earlier Act prescribing limitation for enforcing the right, no change of the law can revive that right after it has become barred by time, unless the later Act is retrospective in its effect, and not merely because a statute of limitation being a law of procedure must be considered to be retrospective in its operation and must be applied to all suits pending in the trial court or under appeal.

Appasami Odayar and others v. Subramanya and others (1) and *Muthukumalli Ramayya and others v. Uppalapati Lakshmayya* (2), relied upon.

Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. C. Soni, passed in Civil Original No. 28 of 1952 on 2nd December, 1952, dismissing the suit with costs.

K. L. GOSAIN, for Appellant.

NEMO, for Respondent.

JUDGMENT.

BISHAN NARAIN, J. This is a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of Soni, J., dismissing the suit of the Punjab Commerce Bank, Limited (in

Bishan Narain,
J.

(1) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 26 (P.C.)

(2) I.L.R. 1943 Mad. 1 (P.C.)

liquidation), Amritsar, against *Shri Brij Lal Mahandiratta*, proprietor of Laj Hosiery, Attar Bazar, Jullundur City, for the recovery of Rs. 10,269-12-6 as barred by time.

The Punjab
Commerce
Bank, Ltd.
v.
*Shri Brij Lal
Mahandiratta*

The facts of the case are that the defendant had a cash credit account with the Lahore Branch of the plaintiff Bank and on 9th of October, 1946, the defendant executed a pronote in favour of the Bank for a sum of Rs. 10,000 balance due to the plaintiff Bank on 1st January, 1947, was Rs. 10,163-6-9. On 17th February, 1948, an application for winding up of the Bank was made in this Court and by his order, dated the 11th October, 1950, Harnam Singh, J., ordered the winding up of the Bank and appointed *Shri Ram Narain Vermani* as official liquidator. On 21st March, 1952, the present suit was filed in this Court under section 45-B of the Banking Companies Act, 1949, as amended by Act XX of 1950. In the plaint, the Bank claimed that the suit was within time as Article 85 of the Indian Limitation Act was applicable to the dealings between the parties and it was further alleged that the cause of action had accrued to the plaintiff on 9th of October, 1946, and that the suit was within time from various dates of part payments and acknowledgments and also because of the Displaced Persons (Institution of Suits and Legal Proceedings Amendment) Act, LXVIII of 1950, and the provisions of the Indian Banking Companies Act. On 11th July, 1952, the following issues were framed by Harnam Singh, J., but we are concerned in this appeal with issue No. 1 only:—

- (1) Whether the suit was within time;
- (2) Whether the Bank was entitled to the interest charged; and
- (3) Whether the defendant was entitled to instalments?

The Punjab Commerce Bank, Ltd.
 v.
 Shri Brij Lal Mahandiratta
 ———
 Bishan Narain, J.

By his judgment, dated the 2nd of December, 1952, Soni, J., dismissed the suit as barred by time holding that the dealings between the parties did not come within Article 85 of the Indian Limitation Act and that under Article 57 the limitation expired on 9th October, 1949. He further held that neither acknowledgments nor section 45F of the Banking Companies Act was of any avail to the plaintiff.

Mr. Gosain, the learned counsel for the plaintiff Bank, in appeal did not press before us the grounds that were urged by his client before Soni, J., to bring the suit within time. He, however, urged that since the decision of Soni, J., the Banking Companies Act of 1949 has been further amended by Act LII of 1953 which came into force on 30th December, 1953, and he urged that this amending Act of 1953 is retrospective in effect and applies to all suits which were pending on the date that the amending Act of 1953 came into force and inasmuch as an appeal is a rehearing of the case the suit is still within time as the amending Act is applicable to the case on the date of the decision. He further urged that in any case the law of limitation being a purely procedural law the amending Act of 1953 should be applied to this case at the time of the decision of the suit.

The question, therefore, arises whether a suit which was admittedly barred on the date of its institution could be held to be within time in view of the amending Act of 1953. In the present case the winding up proceedings were started on 16th February, 1948, under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. On 16th March, 1949, the Banking Companies Act X of 1949 came into force, but it is conceded that this Act does not affect the question now under consideration. Act X of 1949 was amended

by the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act XX of 1950 and in this amending Act Part IIIA was inserted which by section 45-A gave exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court to entertain any matter relating to or arising out of the winding up of a banking company, and by section 45-B the High Court was given exclusive jurisdiction to decide all claims made by or against any banking company. Section 45-F of this amending Act XX of 1950 reads as follows:—

The Punjab
Commerce
Bank, Ltd.
v.
Shri Brij Lal
Mahandiratta
Bishan Narain
J.

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), or in any other law for the time being in force, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or application by a banking company, the period of one year immediately preceding the date of the order for winding up of the banking company shall be excluded.”

It was conceded before us that this section 45-F did not bring the present suit within time. The Banking Companies Act, 1949, was further amended by the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act LII of 1953 and by section 10 of this amending Act a new Part IIIA was substituted for the previous Part IIIA. This amending Act of 1953 came into force on 30th of December, 1953, long after the decision of the suit by Soni, J. Under the new Part IIIA the exclusive power of the High Court to decide all claims was maintained. By section 45-C the High Court was given the power to transfer all cases pending in any other Court immediately before the commencement of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act of 1953 if the High Court thought fit to do so after giving an opportunity to the parties concerned to show cause why

The Punjab the proceedings should not be transferred to the
 Commerce High Court. If such a case was not transferred
 Bank, Ltd. then under section 45-C (4) the proceedings were
 v. to be continued in the Court in which they were
 Shri Brij Lal pending at the time that the amending Act came
 Mahandiratta into force. Section 45-O of this amending Act
 Bishan Narain, reads as follows:—

J.

- “ (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908) or in any other law for the time being in force, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for a suit or application by a banking company which is being wound up, the period commencing from the date of the presentation of the petition for the winding up of the banking company shall be excluded.
- (2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908) or section 235 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913) or in any other law for the time being in force, there shall be no period of limitation for the recovery of arrears of calls from any director of a banking company which is being wound up or for the enforcement by the banking company against any of its directors of any claim based on a contract, express or implied; and in respect of all other claims by the banking company against its directors, the period of limitation shall be twelve years from the date of the accrual of such claims.
- (3) The provisions of this section, in so far as they relate to banking companies being wound up, shall also apply to a banking company in respect of which a petition

for the winding up has been presented before the commencement of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953." I have carefully read this section and in my opinion section 45-O is not retrospective in effect expressly or by necessary implication and further there is nothing in this section so retrospective in effect as to revive a claim which before that date had become unenforceable by lapse of time. Section 45-O (1) lays down that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for a suit or application by a banking company which is being wound up the period commencing from the date of the presentation of the petition for the winding up of the banking company shall be excluded, and subsection (3) makes subsection (1) applicable to a banking company in respect of which a petition for the winding up was presented before the commencement of the Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 1953. It will be noticed that neither subsection (1) nor subsection (3) makes any mention of a pending suit at the time when the amending Act of 1953 came into force although the legislature does provide under section 45-C provisions for transferring such a suit to the High Court. In the absence of any specific mention of pending suits it is not possible to hold that the section would apply to them. Subsection (3) is to a certain extent retrospective in effect because it makes subsection (1) applicable to those cases in which a petition for winding up had been presented before the amending Act, 1953, came into force, but this retrospective effect cannot be extended to claims or suits pending in the High Court at the time that the amending Act came into force. It is well established that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right unless the effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in

The Punjab
Commerce
Bank, Ltd.

v.

Shri Brij Lal
Mahandiratta

Bishan Narain,
J.

The Punjab language which is fairly capable of either inter-
 Commerce pretation, it ought to be construed as prospective
 Bank, Ltd. only. Applying this test I hold that section 45-O
 v. does not apply to pending suits.
 hri Brij Lal-

Mahandiratta The question, however, arises whether the
 amending Act, 1953, can be made applicable to the
 present suit at the present stage because a statute
 of limitation being a law of procedure must be
 considered to be retrospective in its operation and
 must be applied to all suits pending in the trial
 Court or under appeal. In my opinion when once a
 right to sue has become barred under any earlier
 Act prescribing limitation for enforcing the right,
 no change of the law can revive that right after it
 has become barred by time, unless the later Act
 is retrospective in its effect and I have already held
 that the amending Act in question has no such
 effect. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in
Appasami Odayar and others v. Subramanyu
Odayar and others (1), have laid down the law in
 these terms:—

“By section 1, clause 13 of Act XIV of 1859
 a suit for a share of the family property
 not brought within twelve years from
 the date of the last participation in the
 profits of it would be barred. This Act
 continued in force until the 1st July,
 1871, when Act IX of 1871 came into
 force. Consequently if there was no
 participation of profits between 1837
 and 1871, the suit would be barred, and
 the later Acts for limitation of suits need
 not be referred to. If they altered the
 law, they would not revive the right of
 suit.”

Further, their Lordships of the Privy Council have
 stated the law, at page 10 in *Muthukumalli*

(1) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 26 (P.C.)

Ramayya and others v. Uppalapati Lakshmayya The Punjab
(1) :— Commerce Bank, Ltd.

“Ordinarily, the suit would be governed by
Limitation Act IX of 1908, which is the
law in force when the suit was instituted;
but if the defendants are able to show
that the right of action had become barred
under the Act of 1859 then the title that
they had acquired could not be defeated
by the subsequent Limitation Acts.”

v.
Shri Brij Lal-
Mahandiratta
Bishan Narain,
J.

Mr. Gosain urges that these cases relate to immovable property and therefore are not applicable to the present case in view of section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, where a right as distinct from remedy is barred on expiry of limitation. It may, however, be pointed out that the Limitation Act of 1859 had no provision corresponding to section 28 of the 1908 Act and even then their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the 1859 Act in preference to the later amending Acts was applicable. In my opinion the statement of law given in the two cases mentioned above fully applies to the facts of the present case and for the period of limitation and its computation we must look to the Limitation Act, 1908. I am further supported in my view by decisions under section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. Section 20 of the Limitation Act was amended by Act XVI of 1942. Section 2 of the amending Act reads—

“In section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, for the substantive part of subsection (1) the following shall be substituted, namely :—

- (2) Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to

The Punjab
Commerce
Bank, Ltd.
v.
Shri Brij Lal-
Mahandiratta
Bishan Narain,
J.

pay the debt or legacy, or by his duly authorised agent a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made."

Section 2 of the amending Act substituted a new subsection (1) for the substantive part of the old subsection (1) just as Part III-A was substituted by the 1953 amending Act. Thus the cases relating to section 20 after its amendment in 1942, are fully applicable to the present case. In the case reported as *Pearey Lal and others v. Solu Gir* (1), Malik, J., held that if the right to sue had already been barred by the provisions of the Limitation Act then in force, then unless there was something in the later Act which could be deemed to apply retrospectively to revive claims which had already become barred, the new Act could not be availed of for the purpose of saving limitation, and for this purpose Malik, J., relied on *Appasami Odayar and others v. Subramanya Odayar and others* (2), and *Sachindra Nath Roy and others v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh and others* (3), discussed above. A similar view was taken in *Jagdish Prasad Singh v. Saligram Lal and others* (4), and *Pitambar Mohapatra v. Lakshmidar Mohapatra and others* (5).

For these reasons section 45-O is not applicable to the present suit and, therefore, as admitted by Mr. Gosain, counsel for the plaintiff, that the suit under the general law of limitation became barred by time on 9th of October, 1949, it must be dismissed. The result is that the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case I would leave the parties to bear their own costs.

Bhandari, C.J.

BHANDARI, C. J. I agree.

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- (1) A.I.R. 1946 All. 58
(2) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 26 (P.C.)
(3) I.L.R. 49 Cal. 203
(4) A.I.R. 1946 Pat. 60
(5) A.I.R. 1949 Orissa 64